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ABSTRACT
This paper makes a longitudinal analysis of income inequality dynamics in Brazilian house-
holds among three periods: pre-economic crisis (2012-2014), recession (2014-2016) and re-
covery (2016-2019). Using a concept of structural income rather than observed income,
I decompose Gini increases and decreases between Convergence (poorest having higher
earnings growth rates) and Leapfrogging (poorest becoming richer than others). Structural
income allows the analysis for the three periods of study, which is limited when considering
observed income. Results show that, from 2012 to 2015, inequality decreased due to an in-
crease in the income growth of the poorest, which was stronger than the leapfrogging effect.
During the economic crises, inequality increased, with an increase of the reranking compo-
nent, overtaking the convergence component. In the first year of economic recovery, income
convergence decrease while leapfrogging continued to increase, maintaining the Gini index
trend of growth. From 2018 to 2019, reranking effect decreased while the income growth of
the poorest increased, contributing to the maintenance of structural income inequality. I
also perform a separated analysis of the evolution of β-Convergence with a linear regression
and inter quintilic mobility with transition matrices, both confirming previous results. Fi-
nally, I compare these results with an analysis of observed household income from 2015 to
2019 and show that the economic crisis had opposite effects on the dynamics of inequality
between structural and observed household income.
Keywords: Gini Change Decomposition, Inequality, Structural income, Brazil, Conver-
gence, Mobility
RESUMO
Este artigo faz uma análise longitudinal da dinâmica da desigualdade de renda nos
domicílios brasileiros em três períodos diferentes: pré-crise econômica (2012-2014), recessão
(2014-2016) e recuperação (2016-2018). Utilizando um conceito de renda estrutural, de-
componho as variações do Índice de Gini entre os efeitos de convergência (maior taxa de
crescimento da renda para os mais pobres em relação aos mais ricos) e de leapfrogging
(os mais pobres se tornando mais ricos que outros). A renda estrutural permite a análise
para os três períodos de estudo, o que é limitado quando se considera a renda observada.
Os resultados mostram que, entre 2012 e 2015, a desigualdade diminuiu devido a uma
aumento do crescimento da renda dos mais pobres, que superou o efeito da reordenação
dos domicílios ao longo da distribuição. Durante a recessão, a desigualdade aumentou, com
um aumento do efeito de reordenação, que ultrapassou o componente de convergência. Nos
primeiros anos de recuperação econômica, a convergência de renda diminuiu enquanto o
efeito reordenação continuou a aumentar, mantendo a tendência de crescimento do índice
Gini. De 2018 a 2019, o efeito de reordenação diminuiu enquanto crescimento da renda
dos mais pobres aumentou, contribuindo para a manutenção da desigualdade estrutural
de renda. Também realizo uma análise separada da evolução da convergência e mobilidade
inter quintilica por matrizes de transição, ambos confirmando resultados anteriores. Por
fim, estes resultados são comparados com uma análise da renda domiciliar observada entre
2015 e 2019, o que mostra que a crise econômica gerou efeitos opostos na dinâmica da
desigualdade de renda estrutural e desigualdade da renda domiciliar observada.
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Income inequality in Brazil is one of the highest in the world, even considering the decrease
in the 2000s. Inequality reduction was achieved mainly due to a period of economic growth
and income and social inclusion policies, such as minimum wage increases and targeted
social programs. The most commonly used inequality measure – the Gini coefficient (the
closer to 1, the more unequal) – declined from 0.60 in 1990 to 0.51 in 2014. Neri (2013) point
out that 55% of the reduction in Gini between 2002 and 2012 was due to labor income.
On the other hand, Barros and Foguel (2007) highlights the contribution of education to
the reduction of income inequality, due to the reduction of inequality in the education
levels of the population and the salary premium for additional years of study. Poverty
indicators also showed significant improvement in the same period, with the proportion of
poor people declining from 34% in 1992 to around 8% in 2014 (Neri (2018)). With regard
to the measure of poverty intensity (the distance between per capita household income
and the poverty line), there was a reduction of about 10 pp between 2002 and 2013, in
which 34% of this reduction attributed to the minimum wage (Scalioni Brito and Lessa
Kerstenetzky (2019)).
However, the political instability and economic crisis change this performance. The
average labor income decreased by about 10% among heads of household and by 11%
among people with incomplete high school.The increase in unemployment, associated with
double-digit inflation in 2015, were the main contributors to the drop in real income from
work. From mid-2017, disinflation contributed to a small recovery in real income. However,
unemployment had a small decreased, delaying the recovery of households’ purchasing
power. Consequently, the recession had a greater impact among the poorest, as average
income declined 7% while the income of the poorest 5% declined 14% (Neri (2018)).
To sum up, the 2014-2016 recession was the worst and slowest Brazilian recession since
the 1980s, with an accumulated decrease in GDP of 6.7% in the 2015-2016 biennium. In
addition, the recovery from 2017 (around 1% per year) was not enough to reduce unem-
ployment rates that remained at around 11%. Notoriously, the performance of the Brazilian
economy and social indicators interact with each other, which may increase or reduce the
well-being of the population. After the significant reduction in the 2000s, the proportion
of poor people increased by about 3 pp during the recession and decreased by only 2% be-
tween 2017 and 2018. Regarding the performance of inequality in the post-recession period,
the Gini Index of average real monthly household income per capita increased from 0.537
in 2016 to 0.545 in 2018. In addition, there was an increase in the proportion of households
that declared they had no labor income considering the entire 2013-2018 period as well as
the 2016 post-recession biennium (Lameiras and Corseuil (2019)).
The objective of this study is to analyse the dynamics of inequality in these periods
considering the structural income defined as the part of the observed income that is derived
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from holding productive assets, that is, that can generate income, such as physical assets,
schooling years and occupational sector (Mckay and Lawson (2002); Sandoval (2019)).The
literature on inequality trends and socioeconomic mobility is quite extensive, especially
in countries historically recognized as unequal. In the developed world, we have seminal
studies on the evolution of inequality (Piketty (2003); Piketty and Saez (2003)) and their
respective implications for intergenerational income mobility (Chetty et al. (2014), Chetty
et al. (2017)). When we look at the Brazilian case, we also have several studies that ana-
lyze the evolution of inequality in different historical periods, using not only sample data
(Barros and Foguel (2007);Neri (2013)) but also the work of (Medeiros and Souza (2018))
with income tax data. In addition, there is also a range of empirical papers that study
income mobility (Pero and Szerman (2008)) and papers that discuss the relationship be-
tween poverty and inequality, showing a decomposition of the variation in poverty between
pro-poor economic growth and the reduction of inequality (Barros and Mendonça (2001);
Datt and Ravallion (1992)).
The works cited above use observed income from individuals, households or countries,
which is usual within the field of studies on inequality as a whole. However, a part of the
literature on the persistence of poverty that uses an estimated measure of structural income
to understand the dynamics of the process in which income generation is insufficient for
a household/individual to leave the situation of poverty permanently (Carter and Barrett
(2006)). In this respect, using structural income can be considered more advantageous,
since it allows for an analysis less tied to income shocks and dependence on government
assistance transfers. However, studies that jointly discuss the three aspects of income dis-
tribution - inequality trends, existence (or absence) of pro-poor income growth and income
mobility - for Brazil are still scarce. More specifically, there is no study (to my knowledge)
that analysis this dynamic of inequality using some structural income estimation instead
of observed income. In that sense, this work aims to fill this gap in Brazilian literature,
introducing the concept of structural income in the debate on inequality.
Using Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) methodology, I provide a Gini decomposition
approach, which distinguish changes in income inequality between income growth rates
across the distribution (β-convergence effect) and changes in ranking along the income scale
(leapfrogging effect). Instead of using per capita household income, I follow the method-
ology of Sandoval (2019) to estimate an inter-annual data panel of structural income for
Brazilian households between 2012 and 2018. Dividing the analysis of results between three
periods - pre-economic crises (2012-2013), recession period (2014-2016) and recovery (2017-
2019) - I show that inter-annual inequality of structural income in Brazil increased during
and after the economic crisis, with both less increasing income of the poorest and less
mobility - but the second outpacing the first since the recession period. In the recovery
period, there was a small improvement in the pro-poor growth component, although still
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accompanied by the downward trend in mobility. Then, I perform a separated analysis of
β-Convergence by a linear regression and inter quintilic mobility by transition matrices,
both confirming previous results. Finally, I compare this results with the evidence from
observed income and show that the economic crisis had opposite effects on the dynamics
of inequality between structural and observed household income.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature
review of the concept of structural income, Section 3 shows the Gini decomposition between
R-component and P-component, Section 4 describes the Brazilian data and methodology
used, Section 5 presents the results of inequality dynamics and Section 6 compares the
previous results with the dynamics of observed household income. Finally, Section 7 discuss
the main conclusions and research agenda.
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2 Structural Income
The concept of structural income is derived from the literature on poverty trap. In this
framework, the analysis of poverty requires an understanding of its multidimensionality and
the distinction between its static and dynamic conception (Ravallion (2011)). In particu-
lar, it is necessary to distinguish theoretically and empirically individuals who experience
transient poverty from those suffering from chronic poverty. In the first case, individuals
transit this state of poverty temporarily, either because of stochastic factors or changes in
asset accumulation and/or their respective returns. With regard to chronic poverty, the in-
dividual below a certain poverty line remains in this state repeatedly throughout his or her
life cycle, due to structural rather than stochastic conditions (Carter and Barrett (2006)).
Among the characteristics that may be associated with chronic poverty are the scarcity of
physical assets and human capital, demographic composition, household location and low
labor income (Mckay and Lawson (2002)). Thus, the study of chronic poverty concerns
the understanding of poverty as a dynamic process in which poor individuals have low or
no social mobility. In that sense, the concept of structural income can be an important
theoretical apparatus for analyzing not only the poverty process but also the inequality
dynamics within a country.
Regarding the historical evolution of the poverty trap estimation models, the models
that include structural income belong to the third generation (Carter and Barrett (2006)).
The first generation would correspond to the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) measures,
which calculate the proportion of poor individuals from the difference between the mon-
etary poverty line and per capita household consumption or income at a given point in
time. Thus, both the incidence of poverty (FGT (0)) and the intensity of poverty (FGT (1))
could be obtained. This type of method is widely used to track the evolution of a country’s
poverty through the provision of cross-sectional data. However, such analysis reveals only
portraits of poverty at different points in time, so that it would be impossible to identify
which percentage of the population that were poor at any period remained poor in the next
one. Thus, “unfortunate” individuals could fall into the poor population in different sam-
ples and yet it would not be possible to identify whether there is a chronic poverty process
or whether, through transient income shocks, individuals experienced transient poverty at
different points in time of the analyzed period. Therefore, repeated observations of a cer-
tain proportion of poverty could, in reality, mean only a reordering of individuals in this
state.
Considering this gap, the second generation focused on a longitudinal analysis, in which
the same sample of individuals is followed over time. The panel data would thus allow the
distinction of individuals into persistently poor, transiently poor and persistently not poor
(Carter and Barrett (2006)). Some empirical studies used this framework to estimate the
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dynamics of poverty. Fernández-Ramos et al. (2016), for example, found that 36% of Mex-
ico’s poverty is chronic and 64% is transitory, while Alia et al. (2016), following the same
multinomial logistic regression strategy, found large and rapid turnover of Benin’s house-
holds into and out of poverty, which means that they are vulnerable to income shocks.
The shortcoming of this approach, however, lies in the fact that it brings together distinct
processes of experiencing poverty in the same category. Individuals transitioning from poor
to non-poor may have experienced a structural change in asset accumulation and return,
or may have initially experienced a transient income shock that diverted them from their
expected level of well-being to that stock of assets. Similarly, the transition from non-
poverty to poverty can indicate both luck and the deterioration of assets and their returns,
caused by a range of factors such as disease, natural disasters or unemployment (Carter
and Barrett (2006)).
To overcome such obstacles, the third generation of measures is proposed by Carter
and May (2001), based on the formulation of a poverty line based on the estimation of a
structural income - or asset index - that is generated by the existence of productive assets.
According to this framework, production technologies combine the stock of assets (land, hu-
man capital, social capital) with input flows, such as labor, to generate the income stream
(Baulch and Hoddinott (2000)). Thus, household income would be decomposed into struc-
tural income and transient income, following Friedman (1957) hypothesis in which the level
of consumption depends not on current income but on permanent income, which in turn
depends on the stock of productive assets (Sandoval (2019)). The existence of transient
income, determined by temporary shocks, is the main motivation for asset accumulation
in developing countries, and may occur in the form of financial savings, accumulation of
durable goods and investment in human capital. Therefore, according to the third genera-
tion of poverty studies, the poverty situation would exist when accumulated assets produce
a level of well-being equal to or less than a predetermined absolute or relative poverty line.
Considering a stable welfare function over time, a household suffers from stochastic or tran-
sient poverty if the stock of assets generates a higher structural income than the poverty
line, even though its effective income is below that line, due to negative income shocks.
Similarly, chronic poverty will be present if the stock of assets generates an income below
the poverty line as well as its observed income (Carter and Barrett (2006)).
Based on this third generation, I estimate a structural household income using a model
similar to Sandoval (2019). The main contribution of his paper regarding the purpose of
this work is that he account for the fact that members of urban households typically work
on different sectors of the economy, which means that we can not assume that they have
the same income generating function as farmer workers. In this sense, he compares the
results of structural income when using different aggregation variables such as assets of the
head of the household, average possession of assets among workers and total assets among
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workers and finds out that those different aggregations do not change the substance of the
results.
Nevertheless, I used this estimated household structural income to analyze the dynamics
of Brazilian inequality, measured by the Gini Index and decomposed between its mobility
and pro-poor growth components (see 3). This method allow us to study the evolution
of structural economic mobility in Brazil, which is a novel analysis with Brazilian data.
More specifically, I will divide this analysis into three periods: pre-economic crisis (2012-
2013), recession (2014-2016) and recovery (2017-2018), which permit us to compare how
the economic recession hit the poorest relative to the richest.
3 Dynamics of inequality
3.1 β-Convergence
The convergence theory is based on the neoclassical income growth model developed by
Solow (1956), in which the higher income growth rate of poor countries relative to the
rich countries would lead to the decrease of income gap, characterizing a process called
the catching up effect. This could occur because poor countries have lower levels of capital
accumulation, which combined with a technological progress function with diminishing
returns can lead to higher income growth rate.
Considering the empirical estimation of convergence, a pioneering methodology that has
the ability to identify a deterministic trend was developed by Sala-i Martin (1996), who
coined the term β-Convergence as a measure of poor economies (in our case household’s
income) having greater GDP growth rates relative to the rich ones. However, he also
suggests that β-convergence studies the mobility of income within the same distribution,
which will be discussed in the section 3.2. In that sense, a framework for this measure is
to perform the following regression:
ln (Yi,t/Yi,t−1) = β0 + β1 lnYi,t−1 + εi,t (1)
Where lnYi,t and lnYi,t−1 are the log income of a household in a period t and t-1. In
this equation, β1, if negative, means that the poorest had, from t-1 to t, an higher increase
in average than the richest.
3.2 Gini changes decomposition
This section provides a theoretical and empirical framework in which the change in income
inequality between two time periods for a same set of observations can be expressed in
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terms of two components. One is the income growth rates across the distribution and the
other is the changes in ranking along the income scale (leapfrogging effect). The advantage
of using this Gini decomposition approach is that it allows a non-parametric framework
that identifies the key components of the convergence process. Hence, this framework do
not require the underlying growth process to be constant across households, linear in in-
come or monotonic as required when β-convergence is estimated in a linear regression
framework (Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006); O’Neill and Van Kerm (2008)).
Take X as the per capita household income and G(Xt) as the Gini coefficient of a
distribution in any period t. Then, we can decompose the variation of the Gini coefficient
between two time periods following the equation below:
∆G = G(Xt)−G(Xt−1) = R− P (2)
Where R is a measure of reranking, defined by the equation:
R = G(Xt)− C(Xt−1, Xt) (3)
Where C(Xt−1, Xt) is the Concentration coefficient of income, determined by a weighted
average of period t mean-normalized incomes, where the weights are determined by relative
ranks of the baseline period (t-1) (O’Neill and Van Kerm (2008)). P, on the other hand, is
defined by the equation:
P = G(Xt−1)− C(Xt−1, Xt) (4)
According to Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006), P can be interpreted as an indicator
of how much growth has benefited disproportionately to individuals towards the bottom
of the distribution in the initial time period. In other words, is a weighted average of
(mean-normalized) income growth for each household where the weights are given by the
households’ ranks in the initial distribution of incomes. Therefore, P-component equals zero
if income growth rates are equal for all households. If it is positive, income growth tends
to be higher for poorer households and inequality falls. In contrast, negative P-component
means that income growth tends to be higher among richer households, which leads to an
increase in inequality.In order to embody criticism of Sala-i Martin (1996) methodology
regarding non-linearity in the growth process, O’Neill and Van Kerm (2008) interprets
P-Component, as a non-linear measure of β-Convergence.
On the other hand, R-component captures how much a progressive income growth
has lead to reranking between individuals, so that the net reduction in inequality is the
difference between P and R. Friedman (1992) argued that the P component would not
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be a sufficient condition for convergence to occur, since it is possible to observe poor
regions growing at higher rates compared to the richest regions and still diverging. In this
case, the initially poorer countries leapfrog the richer countries, so that the rankings of
countries change. Hence, for a distribution to exhibit β-Convergence, without reducing
inequality, it must be the case that countries are changing ranks. Similarly, it is possible to
present β-Convergence without any positional mobility or rank mobility (O’Neill and Van
Kerm (2008)). Following Yitzhaki and Wodon (2005), R-component may be interpreted
as a measure of mobility (in the form of reranking) in its own right. This interpretation
follows the Pigou–Dalton principle, as stated by Dalton (1920), according to which a higher
income growth for the poor brings more equality, as long as it does not make the richer to
a poorer situation than the poor and, in this sense, incorporates the criticisms expressed
by Friedman (1992).
Therefore, equation 2 states that inequality is reduced by progressive income growth
unless more than offset by concomitant income mobility. The results of Jenkins and Van
Kerm (2006) shows that both in United States and Germany the reranking effect more
than offset the diminishing effect forced by the income growth pro-poor. The former effect
was larger in USA than in Germany and inequality rose faster in the former compared to
the latter.
3.3 Transition matrices
Additionally, I illustrate the evolution of a mobility process using a quintile transition
matrix approach. Therefore, I calculated the probability of change of income quintile to
which the household belongs one year later. The transition probability is calculated by the
following formula:
ptl,k = P (Q12,t+1 = k|Q1,t = l) =
∑11
j=1 #(Qk,j,t → Ql,j+1,t+1)∑11
j=1 #(Qk,j,t)
(5)
in which the first subscript (k or l) indicates the quintile the individual belongs to -
from the richest 1o to the poorest 5o. The numerator gives the sum of the number (#) of
individuals who migrated from quintile k to a given quintile (k and l can be equal, which
in this case would be the total of individuals that remained in the same condition), one
year later. The denominator gives the sum of the number (#) of individuals in quintile k
in the first period. Thus, I obtain the probability of transition from category l to category
k over one year. By definition, the transition matrix is necessarily stochastic. For example,
the probability of transition from quintile 1 to 2 between 2012 and 2013 is the ratio of the
sum of all households that migrated between these quintiles over the sum of all households
that were in quintile 1 in 2012.
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For the purpose of this paper of only highlighting possible patterns of mobility between
income quintiles, this framework is appropriate. However, mobility analyses based on frac-
tile matrices have disadvantages, as summarised by Fields and Ok (1999). First, a fractile
matrix do not take into account income variations that takes place within subgroups.
Second, it does not consider the empirically observed positive-skewness of the income dis-
tributions, which can lead to differences in the absolute income changes that are needed
to move between classes. At last, a fractile matrix may fail to reflect the effect of income
growth on the mobility pattern of the society, that is, one can not conclude changes in
intertemporal equality of a mobility process.
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4 Data and Descriptive statistics
This study uses two databases (annual and quarterly) from the National Continuous House-
hold Sample Survey (PNADC), which is performed by Brazilian Institute for Geography
and Statistics (IBGE). Both bases have followed the same household for five quarters, col-
lecting information from households regarding labour market, education and demographic
conditions. However, the main difference between annual and quarterly microdata is that
the first one contains information about various income sources, while the quarterly data
basically contains work related income. In addition, the annual database with the fifth
interview only exists from 2016, while the annual database with the first interview exists
since 2012. This is important for my analysis because the lack of information from other
sources of income (besides the earnings income) in the fifth interview prevents me from
comparing the estimated structural income with the observed household income for the
period of 2012 to 2016.
In this sense, I estimate the structural household income in two steps. First, I use the
annual database with the first interview from 2012 to 2019 to perform a OLS regression,
using the survey weights, of the observed per capita household income on a set of variables
that are considered relevant in the income generation for urban households, according to
the definition of structural income presented in section 2. Therefore, I include the following
variables: Age of the head of household, which can be a proxy for experience in labor mar-
ket, number of schooling years and occupational group of the head of household (including
a self-employed dummy), which represents measures of productive assets and a variety of
demographic variables that can influence the household income, such as number of kids
(do not contribute to the generation of household income) and number elderly people (can
contribute to pension income and/or retirement). In addition, I also control for number of
individuals within the household and a gender dummy for the head of the household.
Thus, we have the following equation for estimating structural income:
lnYhpc = β0 + β1Nind+ β2Agehead + β3Educationhead + β4Ocupationhead + β5Number_Employee
+β6Number_Kids+ β7Number_Elderly + β8Region+ β9Self_employed+ β10Genderhead + ε
(6)
Where lnYhpc is the observed log per capita income of a household in the first interview.Nind
is the number of individuals within the household, Agehead is the age of the head of the
household,Educationhead is the schooling years of the head of the household,Ocupationhead
is a vector containing ten employee occupation dummies, following the database classifica-
tion itself (baseline = "Other occupational group"), Number_Employee is the number of
employees within the household,Number_Kids is a vector of the number of kids within the
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household grouped by age range (0-5 years, 6-14 years, 15-17 years and 18 years or more),
Number_Elderly is the number of elderly people within the household, Self_employed
is the number of self employed people within the household, Region is a vector contain-
ing four region dummies (North, Midwest, Southeast and South), Genderhead is a dummy
which is equal to 1 if the household’s head is female and ε is the term error.
The observed per capita household income was deflated by income ranges, using an
indicator created by the Applied Economic Research Institute (IPEA) (Ipea et al. (2019)).
Then, I assume that the coefficients estimates are stable, that is, the returns do not changed
in that year and estimate the per capita structural household income for the first and last
interviews of that same household. That is, I gathered all the quarterly data of the initial
year and subset for those households that were doing the first interview and the same for
the following year, for those households that were doing the fifth interview. After that, I
merge this two datasets by each household identification, creating a panel data. By follow-
ing this procedure, I remove possible quarterly seasonal effects. This approach is necessary
because of the lack of a data panel of the first and fifth interviews with all sources of income
for the period of 2012 to 2018.
After estimating this regression for the income observed in the first interview, I input
these coefficients in the data from the fifth interview. In that sense, the predicted income
can be considered the structural income, as it is the part of the observed income that can
be explained by productive assets such as schooling years, occupational groups and other
demographic variables that can influence a household’s income generation.
4.1 Annual microdata
Table 1 below shows the evolution of data observations of the yearly microdata used to
estimate the structural household income coefficients. The sample from 2012 has almost
446,445 individuals that, when weighted, represents almost 200 million individuals from
the total population. 2019 sample, on the other hand, has 443,790 individuals that, when
weighted, represents little more than 209 million from the total population. However, our
data observations are households and not individuals. Since all members of the household
have the same values for the same variables, generating the number of single households
in the sample. Hence, there are about 124,000 households in the panel data of 2012-2013,
about 132,000 in 2013-2014 and almost 140,000 households for the following years.
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Table 1: Number of individuals in PNADC









Source: PNADC from 2012 to 2019
Some descriptive statistics about the most relevant variables associated with structural
income, that is, observed per capital household income, years of schooling and employee
ocuppation of the head of the household are shown in the tables below. The statistics of all
the other variables in the model can be found in the appendix section (8). From Table 2, we
observe small changes in per capita household income (PCHI) statistics. I established that
the minimum income is always equal to one because some households report zero income
and this would prevent the log-transformation.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of observed per capita household income (PCHI)
Year N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
2012 446, 445 1, 171.390 1, 871.157 1.000 389.043 1, 262.138 90, 979.760
2013 461, 033 1, 194.238 1, 826.776 1.000 410.185 1, 296.787 82, 180.530
2014 465, 038 1, 234.492 1, 819.605 1.000 433.118 1, 350.651 106, 469.400
2015 459, 273 1, 195.463 1, 782.119 1.000 416.074 1, 316.851 89, 739.790
2016 459, 718 1, 159.581 1, 764.492 1.000 389.114 1, 282.276 110, 452.100
2017 457, 992 1, 189.682 1, 897.078 1.000 393.977 1, 307.519 159, 786.200
2018 452, 654 1, 235.340 2, 015.875 1.000 396.557 1, 348.695 214, 877.200
2019 443, 790 1, 248.000 2, 049.431 1.000 400.900 1, 372.500 154, 502.700
Source: PNADC from 2012 to 2019
Table 3 shows the percentage of households for each year of the head of household’s
schooling, along with the mean and median for the period 2012-2019. We can observe
that about 1/5 of the households have a head of household with 12 years of schooling.
The second highest frequency is that of households whose head has 5 years of schooling,
followed by households whose head has zero years of schooling. From 2017, this relationship
18
Table 3: Years of schooling of the head of household
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
0 11.507 11.118 10.875 10.639 10.803 10.044 9.319 8.2
1 4.681 4.579 4.314 3.978 4.291 3.36 2.812 2.7
2 2.639 2.722 2.736 2.662 2.618 2.518 2.716 2.7
3 4.116 4.097 4.079 4.089 3.921 3.831 3.735 3.6
4 5.278 5.188 4.955 4.881 4.619 4.782 4.589 4.5
5 13.388 13.148 12.955 12.58 11.851 11.575 11.76 11
6 6.393 6.414 6.12 6.222 6.122 6.357 6.109 6.3
7 3.003 2.962 3.02 3.024 3.453 3.658 3.617 3.8
8 3.014 3.072 2.937 3.058 3.085 3.327 3.399 3.7
9 9.999 10.113 10.308 9.863 8.926 8.415 8.072 8.3
10 1.794 1.896 1.834 1.908 1.986 2.309 2.336 2.6
11 1.857 1.883 1.87 1.98 2.022 2.192 2.163 2.5
12 20.36 20.545 21.002 21.345 21.737 21.919 22.42 23.9
13 1.122 1.144 1.116 1.32 1.754 1.982 2.048 1.9
14 1.098 1.141 1.185 1.288 1.341 1.364 1.459 1.4
15 1.226 1.256 1.279 1.343 1.288 1.319 1.477 1.4
16 8.526 8.722 9.415 9.818 10.183 11.049 11.97 11.5
Mean 7.513 7.591 7.726 7.852 7.917 8.146 8.353 8.499
Median 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9
Source: PNADC from 2012 to 2019
is reversed and the third highest frequency is that of households whose head has 16 years
of schooling. This movement is a reflection of the increase of three percentage points in the
percentage of households whose head has completed higher education and a reduction of
two percentage points in the percentage of households whose head has zero and five years
of study.
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Table 4: Number of employed within the household
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
0 33.344 33.677 34.517 35.499 38.13 39.689 40.547 40.1
1 27.93 28.175 28.002 27.928 27.431 26.251 25.825 20.33
2 28.091 28.146 27.806 27.469 26.269 26.03 25.842 28.02
3 7.793 7.338 7.154 6.776 6.081 5.985 5.846 8.04
4 2.221 2.127 2.004 1.859 1.673 1.648 1.569 2.66
5 0.476 0.415 0.411 0.373 0.327 0.317 0.299 0.63
6 0.115 0.097 0.084 0.07 0.066 0.055 0.055 0.15
7 0.024 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.016 0.011 0.04
8 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.02
9 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0
10 - 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 - 0.001 -
11 - - - - - 0.001 -
Mean 1.197 1.178 1.158 1.131 1.071 1.05 1.033 1.156
Median 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Source: PNADC from 2012 to 2019
In turn, the distribution of households by number of employed members is shown in
the table 4 above. Although the median remained stable in one employed member of
the household, there was an increase of about 7 percentage points in the percentage of
households with zero employed members, throughout the sample period.
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The descriptive statistics of the estimated structural income are are presented in Table
5. Comparing the first and fifth interview, we observed that there was an increase in mean
income in 2013, 2014 and 2015, a decrease in 2016 and 2017, an increase in 2018 and a
decrease in 2019, relative to the respective previous years. The income evolution pattern
was similar for the first and fourth quartiles, except in 2018 and 2019, where the poorest
and the richest quartiles showed opposite changes.
Table 5: Structural per capita household income
First Interview
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Min. 15 18 25 24 17 24 24
1st Qu. 506 524 559 573 519 475 502
Median 825 847 891 953 897 821 839
Mean 1062 1085 1127 1160 1116 1032 1113
3rd Qu. 1307 1331 1378 1525 1472 1357 1362
Max. 12323 13073 16293 11151 12655 10451 35202
Fifth Interview
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Min. 20 15 28 15 23 23 15
1st Qu. 537 563 582 524 474 500 482
Median 863 891 968 907 822 834 818
Mean 1094 1115 1169 1119 1032 1098 1093
3rd Qu. 1341 1368 1534 1466 1355 1342 1365
Max. 12709 14241 11071 13392 14296 20503 19414
Source: PNADC from 2012 to 2019
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Finally, the structural and observed income mean per quintile are shown in table 6.
In 2015 and 2016, the average of structural income is higher than the average of observed
income for all quintiles except the richest (fifth quintile). In 2017, the average of structural
income is smaller than the average of observed income for all quintiles except the poorest.
In the last year, the average of structural income is smaller than the average of observed
income for all quintiles except the first and second. Part of this difference can be attributed
to the fact that some households report zero income as well as the construction of structural
income itself.
Table 6: Income mean per quintile - First interview
Structural income
Year 1o quintile 2o quintile 3o quintile 4o quintile 5oquintile
2012 301 566 829 1196 2420
2013 316 586 850 1219 2449
2014 342 622 895 1265 2511
2015 342 645 959 1394 2461
2016 305 590 902 1341 2442
2017 282 539 826 1233 2281
2018 294 565 843 1240 2625
Observed income
Year 1o quintile 2o quintile 3o quintile 4o quintile 5oquintile
2015 276 575 910 1388 4019
2016 256 549 889 1330 3875
2017 250 553 912 1362 4036
2018 249 561 925 1400 4165
The remaining descriptive statistics can be found in the annex section 8. Table A1
presents the frequency of household in each region dummy, Table A2 shows the frequency
of households in each occupational group and Table A3 shows the mean of the other
explanatory variables. Tables A4-A7 presents the regression results and finally, Figures B1
to B8 show the scatter plots of the structural income and observed income between 2015
and 2019 (only years for which such analysis is possible).
22
5 Results
5.1 Evolution of β Convergence Effect
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the coefficient associated with pro-poor growth. As men-
tioned in section 3, the more negative β is, higher in average was the income growth of
those who were poorer in the first interview. As one can see, the pre-economic crisis pe-
riod (2012-2014) was marked by a more negative coefficient, which means that the income
growth rate of the poorest was higher, relative to the richest. In the recession (2014-2016),
there was small reduction (in module) of the β coefficient, which means that the recession
was stronger for the poorest compared to the richest. In the recovery period, there was a
greater reduction (in module) of the β coefficient. This evidence suggests that the poorest
households did not benefit from the recovery period of the economic recession.
Figure 1: β-Convergence from 2012-2013 to 2018-2019
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
5.2 Evolution of Gini Changes decomposition
After assigning the statistically significant coefficients of the tables A4, A5, A6 and A7 in
the respective quarterly databases, we calculate the evolution of the Gini Index of structural
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household income. Table 7 bellow shows the average decomposition of annual Gini changes
over the period. The results show that the Gini coefficient decrease between 2012 and
2015, increase between 2015 and 2016, remained stable in 2016-2017, increase in between
2017 and 2018 and remained stable in 2018-2019. Between 2012 and 2015, the pro-poor
income growth (P-component) was greater than the leapfrogging effect (R-component),
which led to a reduction in inequality. In 2016, the R-component increased and overtaked
the P-component, which meant a positive variation in the Gini coefficient. In 2017, the
R-component decreased, while the P-component remained stable, which led to a small
variation of inequality. In 2018, the reranking effect more than offset the diminishing effect
forced by the income growth pro-poor, which contributed to a big increase in inequality.
Finally, in 2019, the R-component decrease while the P-component increase until they got
closer in value, contributing to the maintenance of structural income inequality.
Table 7: Gini Dynamics Decomposition of the Structural Household Income Per Capita
Decomposition 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
G0 0.3939 0.3889 0.3803 0.366 0.3841 0.3881 0.4132
G1 0.3835 0.3748 0.3636 0.3818 0.3894 0.41 0.4147
delta -0.0104 -0.0141 -0.0167 0.0157 0.0052 0.0218 0.0015
R-comp 0.0659 0.0643 0.0825 0.0923 0.0808 0.0811 0.0623
P-comp 0.0763 0.0784 0.0992 0.0765 0.0756 0.0593 0.0608
Source: Estimates from PNADC from 2012 to 2019,
based on Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) methodology.
5.3 Evolution of Leapfrogging Effect
In this subsection, I show the evolution of two measures of mobility, using a quintile
transition matrix. First, Figure 2 bellow shows the conditional probability of changing the
structural income quintile to which the household belonged in the first interview. In the case
of households belonging to the poorest quintile (1st quintile) in the first interview, we have
the evolution of the probability that this household belongs to any other income quintile
a year later, in the fifth interview. As one can see, the poorest and the richest showed
similar patterns. The exceptions are in the economic crisis period, where the richest lost
income mobility (that is, they have benefited, since they are at the top of the distribution
and having mobility means being relatively poorer) and the poorest have gained mobility
(that is, they also benefited, since having mobility means getting relatively richer) and
in the first year of recovery, where the poorest lost mobility while the richest showed an
increase. The quintiles of the middle of distribution also presented a similar pattern, with
24
an increase in mobility in pre-crisis period, a decrease in the recession period, an increase
in the first year of recovery and a downward trend in the following year.
Figure 2: Inter Annual Probability of Changing Structural Income Quintile from 2012-13
to 2018-2019
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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Comparing the changes in mobility between the pre-crisis and recovery periods for the
extremes of the distribution I find that the richest quintile showed a 10% decrease in the
probability of moving to a poorer quintile, while the poorest showed a 7% decrease in
the probability of moving up in the distribution. This evidence suggests that the richest
quintile benefited, in terms of mobility, with the economic crisis while the poorest were
harmed.
Figure 3 shows us the probability of becoming richer for the middle quintiles. Results
show that they presented similar patterns in the period, in which the 2nd and 3rd quintiles
have considerably greater mobility than that of the 4th quintile. This evidence is counter-
intuitive in relation to the structural income literature, since we would expect that the
richest quintiles would be more likely to become richer, as they may face smaller barriers
in the process of accumulating productive assets such as increased education, access to more
stable formal jobs, inclusion in the credit market and access to social connections(Chantarat
and Barrett (2012);Matsuyama (2004)).
Figure 3: Inter Annual Probability of rise from the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quintiles of structural
income from 2012-13 to 2018-19
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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6 Observed and structural household income
As mentioned in section 4, the absence of the fifth household interview in annual PNADC
before 2016 do not allow the comparative analysis of the estimated structural income
and observed income in the whole period (2012-2019). However, this section shows the
decomposition of Gini changes and the evolution of β-Convergence and Leapfrogging effects
using observed household income for the data we have (2016-2019), as a way of comparing
with the results of structural income presented in section 5.
Considering the annual data for the 1st and 5th interviews for 2016, 2017,2018 and
2019, I do not need to use the quarterly bases, as done in 4. Hence, the observed household
income was calculated using only the PNAD Continuous annual database for the first and
fifth interviews. Similarly to what was done in section 4, the annual bases of the first and
fifth interviews were merged through an identifier for each person within the household,
creating a panel data.
6.1 Evolution of β-Convergence Effect
Figure 4 bellow shows the evolution of the β-Convergence of the observed household income
from period 2015-2016 to 2018-2019. As we can see, the coefficient decrease (in module)
during the recession and increase (in module) during the recovery, which indicates an
increase in the P-component, as shown in table 8. Comparing with the β-Convergence of
structural income, this coefficient remained stable between 2016 and 2017 and decrease
(in module) in the following years. This means that the period of economic recovery had
opposite effects in the income growth rate of the poorest between observed income and the
structural income.
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Figure 4: β-Convergence from 2015-16 to 2018-19
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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6.2 Evolution of Gini Changes decomposition
The results of the table 8 bellow show us that inter-annual inequality of the observed
income is higher than the Gini Index of the structural income. The observed income Gini
decreased between 2015 and 2016, while the structural income Gini increased. In 2016-2017
both structural and observed income Gini remained relatively stable. In the following years,
the observed income Gini remained stable, while the structural income Gini increased in
the period 2017-2018 and remained constant in the last year of the sample. Between 2016
and 2017, the increase in income inequality observed was associated with a decrease in
both components. In the following year, the pro-poor growth component increased and
the mobility component decreased, with the first outpacing the second. In the last year,
R-component increased more than the P-component, which contributed to the increase in
inequality.
Table 8: Gini Dynamics Decomposition of the Observed Household Income Per Capita
Decomposition 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
G0 0.5133 0.5156 0.5238 0.5286
G1 0.5086 0.5173 0.5204 0.5258
Gini Change -0.0046 0.0017 -0.0035 -0.0027
Average R-component 0.0795 0.0787 0.0777 0.0913
Average P-component 0.0841 0.077 0.0812 0.0940
Source: Estimates from PNADC from 2016 to 2019,
based on Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) methodology.
6.3 Evolution of Leapfrogging Effect
In this subsection, Figure 5 present the evolution of the leapfrogging effect from 2015-2016
to 2018-2019. The poorest and middle class presented similar patterns, with a decrease
between 2016 and 2017, a stability between 2017 and 2018 and an increase in the last
year. The second and fourth quintiles also showed a similar evolution, with a decrease in
mobility in 2015-2018 and an increase between 2018 and 2019. The richest, however, showed
a stability between 2016 and 2017, a decrease between 2017 and 2018, and an increase in the
last year. Comparing with the structural income results, the two richest quintiles showed an
increase in structural income mobility and a decrease in observed income mobility between
2017 and 2018. Moreover, in contrast to the increase in mobility observed with the observed
income in the last year of the sample, structural income mobility decreased for all quintiles
in that period.
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Figure 5: Inter Annual Probability of Changing Observed Per Capita Household Income
Quintile from 2015-16 to 2018-19
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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Regarding the measure of ascension of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quintiles, the results pre-
sented in figure 6 bellow shows that the probability of ascension of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
quintiles remained almost stable in the entire period, contrary to what was observed with
structural income (increase for all quintiles between 2016 and 2017 and decreased in the
following years).
Figure 6: Inter Annual Probability of rise from the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quintiles of observed
income from 2015-16 to 2018-19
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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7 Conclusion
This paper showed that inter-annual inequality of structural income in Brazil increased
after the economic crisis, with both less increasing income of the poorest and less mobility
- but the second outpacing the first. Considering our longitudinal data on the same house-
holds for five quarters, I show that β-Convergence decreased by 26% (in module), from
-0.20 to around -0.15. On the other hand, the pattern of the probability of a household
to move from his structural household income quintile to another a year later was similar
to the poorest and the richest. The exceptions are in the economic crisis period, where
the richest lost income mobility (that is, they have benefited, since they are at the top of
the distribution and having mobility means being relatively poorer) and the poorest have
gained mobility (that is, they also benefited, since having mobility means getting relatively
richer) and in the first year of recovery, where the poorest lost mobility while the richest
showed an increase.
Comparing the whole period (2012-2019) for the extremes of the distribution I find that
the richest quintile showed a 10% decrease in the probability of moving to a poorer quintile,
while the poorest showed a 7% decrease in the probability of moving up in the distribution.
This evidence suggests that the richest quintile benefited, in terms of mobility, with the
economic crisis while the poorest were harmed. Regarding the middle class (3rdquintile),
the loss of mobility between 2012 and 2019 was similar to that of the poorest quintile, with
a decrease of about 6%. Moreover, the 2nd and 3rd quintiles have considerably greater
mobility than that of the 4th quintile, which is counter-intuitive in relation to the structural
income literature.
The results for the Gini coefficient showed that structural income inequality decrease
between 2012 and 2015, increase between 2015 and 2016, remained stable in 2016-2017,
increase between 2017 and 2018 and remained stable in 2018-2019. Decomposing the inter-
annual Gini changes, we can see that both reranking effect and pro-poor income growth
component decreased throughout the whole period. Between 2012 and 2015, the pro-poor
income growth (P-component) was greater than the leapfrogging effect (R-component),
which led to a reduction in inequality. In 2016, the R-component increased and overtaked
the P-component, which meant a positive variation in the Gini coefficient. In 2017, the
reranking effect decreased, while the P-component remained stable, which led to a small
variation of inequality. In 2018, the reranking effect more than offset the diminishing effect
forced by the income growth pro-poor, which contributed to a big increase in inequality.
Finally, in 2019, the R-component decrease while the P-component increase, which kept
the structural income inequality stable.
I also present the same analyzes using observed household income between 2015 and
2019, which are the years we have income data from all sources for both the first and fifth
interviews. To sum up the compared results, the evolution of β-Convergence was different
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between structural and observed income. More specifically, the coefficient decrease (in
module) during the recession and increase (in module) during the recovery, which indicates
an increase in the P-component. Comparing with the β-Convergence of structural income,
this coefficient remained stable between 2016 and 2017 and decrease (in module) in the
following years.This evidence suggests that the period of economic recovery had opposite
effects in the income growth rate of the poorest between observed income and the structural
income.
Analyzing the evolution of observed income inequality, the recession period was charac-
terized by a reduction in observed income inequality and an increase in structural income
Gini. In 2016-2017 both structural and observed income Gini remained relatively stable.
In the following years, the observed income Gini remained stable, while the structural in-
come Gini increased in the period 2017-2018 and remained constant in the last year of the
sample. Regarding the quintile transition matrices, the poorest and middle class presented
similar patterns, with a decrease between 2016 and 2017 and an increase in the last year.
The richest, however, showed a stability between 2016 and 2017, followed by a decrease in
2017-2018 and an increase in the last year of the sample.
There are some limitations of analysis derived from data restriction and methodology.
First, the OLS estimation of the structural income do not allow for omitted variable is-
sues,such as physical assets. Second, in this article, I do not consider the possibility of a
positive relationship between income and marginal return on the productive assets included
in the model. (Carter and Barrett (2006)).
Nevertheless, this study brings a novel longitudinal analysis for the period in Brazil and
introduces the concept of structural income to the debate on poverty, inequality and so-
cioeconomic mobility. Not only the structural income Gini is considerably smaller than the
observed income Gini but the results suggest that the change in structural income inequal-
ity is greater than the change in income inequality observed. The analysis of structural
income is relevant to the public policy debate as it introduces the concept of households’
ability to generate income. This is important when considering development projects for a
country, in which the poorest families are expected to suffer more from the instability and
low income generation capacity.
Because of the absence of similar studies for Brazil to serve as a comparison, further
research on structural income with more extensive panel data is needed to generate increas-
ingly robust evidence about three facets of the structural income generation process: the
persistence of poverty, the low income mobility in Brazil and the trend difference between
structural and observed income. With this evidence, policy makers have a greater basis for
building more effective and efficient policies to combat poverty and structural inequality.
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Table A1: Frequency of dummy regions - Annual PNADC
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
North 17.67 18.2 18.43 18.2 18.57 18.46 18.12 20.97
South 26.7 26.3 26.08 26.33 26.18 26.11 26.12 24.90
Midwest 15.11 15.14 14.88 14.86 15.03 15.05 14.97 14.79
Southeast 40.53 40.36 40.61 40.61 40.22 40.38 40.8 39.32



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A4: Regression Results 2012-2013
Dependent variable:





Number of household members -0.057∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
Age of head of the household 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Age of head of the household squared 0.00∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Urban household 0.135∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008)
Years of education of head of the household 0.064∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
One year in the current job 0.654∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.067)
Two years in the current job 0.745∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.065)
Three years in the current job 0.747∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.065)
Four years in the current job 0.781∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.008)




Log per capita household observed income
2012 2013
(1) (2)
Number of kids between 6 and 14 years -0.175∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Number of kids between 15 and 17 years -0.191∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009)
Number of kids with 18+ years -0.008 0.02∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Number of employed household members 0.151∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Number of eldery members (60+ years) 0.155∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006)
North region 0.115∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
Midwest region 0.351∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
South region 0.386∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Southeast region 0.286∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Directors and managers 0.205∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.065)
Science and intellectual professionals 0.201∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.065)
Mid-level technicians and professionals -0.1 -0.043
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Dependent variable:




Administrative support workers -0.307∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.065)
Service and trade workers -0.359∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.064)
Skilled agricultural workers -0.408∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.065)
Operators of installations and machines -0.315∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.065)
Mechanical workers and construction craftsmen -0.303∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.064)
Elementary occupations -0.550∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.064)
Police and military firefighters 0.215∗∗ 0.211∗∗
(0.074) (0.074)
Number of self-employed household members -0.084∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)




Adjusted R2 0.343 0.346
Residual Std. Error 21.416 (df 137906) 20.654 (df = 145042)
42
Dependent variable:
Log per capita household observed income
2012 2013
(1) (2)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A6: Regression Results 2017-2018
Dependent variable:





Number of household members -0.005 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
Age of head of the household 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Age of head of the household squared 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Urban household 0.093∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Years of education of head of the household 0.064∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
One year in the current job 0.549 0.315
(0.447) (0.195)
Two years in the current job 0.658 0.477∗
(0.447) (0.194)
Three years in the current job 0.699 0.497∗
(0.447) (0.195)
Four years in the current job 0.739 0.545∗∗
(0.447) (0.194)




Log per capita household observed income
2017 2018
(1) (2)
Number of kids between 6 and 14 years -0.209∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Number of kids between 15 and 17 years -0.249∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Number of kids with 18+ years -0.073∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Number of employed household members 0.169∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Number of eldery members (60+ years) 0.176∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006)
North region 0.041∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
Midwest region 0.358∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
South region 0.41∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Southeast region 0.255∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Directors and managers 0.437 0.649∗∗∗
(0.447) (0.195)
Science and intellectual professionals 0.447 0.578∗∗
(0.447) (0.194)




Log per capita household observed income
2017 2018
(1) (2)
Mid-level technicians and professionals 0.07 0.273
(0.447) (0.194)
Skilled agricultural workers -0.272 -0.069
(0.447) (0.194)
Service and trade workers -0.215 -0.035
(0.447) (0.194)
Operators of installations and machines -0.17 0.014
(0.447) (0.194)
Mechanical workers and construction craftsmen -0.141 0.047
(0.447) (0.194)
Elementary occupations -0.397 -0.226
(0.447) (0.194)
Police and military firefighters 0.532 0.721∗∗∗
(0.448) (0.197)
Number of self-employed household members -0.121∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)




Adjusted R2 0.329 0.340
Residual Std. Error 23.125 (df = 151623) 23.182 (df = 151947)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table A7: Regression Results 2019
Dependent variable: Log per capita household observed income
(Intercept) 4.8094∗∗∗
(0.0311)
Number of household members 0.0192∗∗∗
(0.0056)
Age of head of the household 0.0002
(0.0011)




Years of education of head of the household 0.0701∗∗∗
(0.0008)
One year in the current job 0.7884∗∗
(0.2531)
Two years in the current job 0.9708∗∗∗
(0.2523)
Three years in the current job 1.0263∗∗∗
(0.2524)
Four years in the current job 1.0544∗∗∗
(0.2522)
Number of kids up to 5 years -0.2392∗∗∗
(0.0086)
Number of kids between 6 and 14 years -0.2385∗∗∗
(0.0074)
Number of kids between 15 and 17 years -0.2803∗∗∗
(0.0066)
Number of kids with 18+ years -0.0947∗∗∗
(0.0066)
Number of employed household members 0.1366∗∗∗
(0.0054)












Directors and managers 0.1647
(0.2524)
Science and intellectual professionals 0.0973
(0.2522)
Mid-level technicians and professionals -0.2331
(0.2523)
Administrative support workers -0.4358
(0.2523)
Service and trade workers -0.5161∗
(0.252)
Skilled agricultural workers -0.554∗
(0.2524)
Operators of installations and machines -0.437
(0.2521)




Police and military firefighters 0.2257
(0.2546)
Number of self-employed household members -0.1136∗∗∗
(0.006)





Residual Std. Error 23.542 (df = 150635)
F Statistic 2,491∗∗∗ (df = 31; 150635)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Figure B1: Scatter plot of observed and structural household income from 1o interview
of 2015
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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Figure B2: Scatter plot of observed and structural household income from 5o interview
of 2016
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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Figure B3: Scatter plot of observed and structural household income from 1o interview
of 2016
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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Figure B4: Scatter plot of observed and structural household income from 5o interview
of 2017
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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Figure B5: Scatter plot of observed and structural household income from 1o interview
of 2017
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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Figure B6: Scatter plot of observed and structural household income from 5o interview
of 2018
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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Figure B7: Scatter plot of observed and structural household income from 1o interview
of 2018
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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Figure B8: Scatter plot of observed and structural household income from 5o interview
of 2019
Source: PNADC, IBGE - author’s elaboration
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